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ABSTRACT 
The lack of specificity about the role of Research Ethics Boards concerning monitoring of 
clinical research in this new context of private sponsorship, and centrally depending on 
researchers to monitor clinical research is worrying—given the level of research misconduct and 
the recurrence of preventable scandals and unethical practices. This thesis is about the ethical 
necessity of ongoing REB monitoring, while clinical research is being conducted. An initial 
review, nominal annual reporting, and ad hoc notifications of problems after they occur are likely 
only to detect problems after harms have occurred. While acknowledging the recommendations 
of the various policy documents like Canada's TCPS2, US Common Rule, and ICH-GCP have 
been inadequate, I argue that adequate REB post-initial-review monitoring requires greater REB 
involvement, rather than trust and researchers’ assurances. The REBs’ monitoring should include 
continual onsite monitoring and paternalistic continuous review, to protect subjects who are 
contributing to scientific knowledge. Subject safety and overall research integrity are imperative 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
1.1 General Introduction 
Clinical research is continually being undertaken to test for the safety and effectiveness of new 
products and interventions (Parker, 2016). Clinical research is essential to understanding current 
treatment trends, providing better therapeutic options (Jain, Kuppili, Pattanayak, & Sagar, 2017), 
and improving overall human health (Grady, 2015). Research benefits society in several ways, 
including contributing to the understanding of how to reflect and act on medical issues (Romero, 
2013; Steneck, 2007). These research begins with preclinical tests on animals to determine the 
level of toxicity of the intervention before it is tested on human subjects. However, the clinical 
research environment is plagued with several ethical issues relating to informed consent, 
conflicts of interest, the standard of care, therapeutic misconception, exploitation and many 
more. Clinical research also imposes or can impose unacceptable risks on human research 
subjects. Exposé from past research studies like the Tuskegee experiment by the US Public 
Health Service where the natural progression of syphilis with male African-Americans were 
studied (Wurtzurg, 2016), the Canadian nutritional experiments with aboriginal populations and 
residential schools (Mosby, 2013), the Willowbrook school experiment where mentally disabled 
persons were intentionally infected with hepatitis (Robinson & Unruh, 2008), and other recent 
instances of unethical research practices (which I discuss in subsequent chapters) highlights the 
need for institutions to continue to protect human research subjects who participate in research as 
a way of ensuring overall research integrity. 
 
1.2 Formation of REBs 
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The history of research with human subjects in the 20th century is marred by scandals. 
These scandals were highly publicized, and dealt a blow to the reputation of both the research 
enterprise and the medical profession (Frohlich, 2006). Scandals, like the Tuskegee study, the 
Willowbrook school experiment and other infamous research scandals, left a huge legacy of 
distrust and a dent on the integrity of the research enterprise (Kohn, 1984; Nardini, 2014). Many 
clinical research projects ended up being disasters for which subjects would have been better off 
had they not been enrolled in those studies. The results of some of the scandals were terrible, 
costing the lives of many human research subjects who, for altruistic reasons, decided to 
volunteer as research subjects and for the many subjects who were coerced into such studies 
(Icenogle, 2003; Onixt & Sterling, 2009; Stephen, 2006; Willyard, 2007). The overall impact of 
the numerous past scandals and abuses is that, “unfortunately, the public's confidence in our 
work, our competence, and our ethics has been seriously shaken,” as argued by Shalala (2000, p. 
808), a former Secretary of the US Department of Health and Human Services. Scholars like 
Caplan (1989) have described these scandals as the turning point in research with human subjects 
and a reference point in modern bioethics (as cited in Rosner et al., 1991). 
This history of research with human subjects has had a significant influence on how 
bioethicists, philosophers, policymakers and other scholars understand the concerns raised in 
clinical research and on how these players attempt to address research ethics issues (Wendler, 
2017). That is, there have been several guidelines and reforms to human subject protection 
systems over the years as a direct response to several cases of abuse and scandals which led to 
public outcry about the ‘unethical’ nature of clinical research at the time. These policies, 
regulations and reforms were made to guide the ethical conduct of research with human subjects 
(Onixt & Sterling, 2009; Wendler, 2017). One of these such significant reforms was proposed by 
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a former National Institutes of Health (NIH) Director, James Shannon, who called for the 
independent evaluation of research involving human subjects in 1965 (Fleischman, 2005; Grady, 
2015), subsequently leading to the formation of Institutional Review Boards/Research Ethics 
Boards (IRBs/REBs) in 1974 to adequately protect research subjects (Elliott, 2015; Fleischman, 
2005; Godfrey, Payton, Tasker, Proestel, & Schouten, 2014; Rice, 2008; Weijer, 2001). Clinical 
research has since been regulated to ensure that risk-benefit analysis is favourable (i.e., risks and 
harms to research subjects do not outweigh the benefits) and also to ensure researchers are 
complying with all policies and regulations related to research subjects protection (Horner & 
Minifie, 2011; Steneck, 2007).  
REBs serve as the primary institutional structure placed between researchers and human 
subjects being used for research (Icenogle, 2003) with a dual responsibility of guaranteeing 
research subjects’ protection and ensuring researcher and institutional compliance (Greenwald, 
Ryan & Mulvihill, 1982). REBs review research on behalf of the institution, including 
approving, rejecting, proposing modifications to, or terminating any proposed or ongoing 
research involving humans within the jurisdiction of the institution (TCPS, 2014, p. 20). They 
also have an obligation to uphold the ethical integrity of research by continuously reviewing 
research protocols to ensure that research subjects are safe and are being ethically treated during 
the research (Shekelle, Ruelaz, Miake-Lye, Beroes, & Newberry, 2012). Currently, most 
universities, hospitals and research institutions in various countries have at least one REB and, in 
those jurisdictions, research cannot be conducted without the initial review and approval from a 
REB. Depending on one’s jurisdiction, the Research Ethics Boards (REBs) may be known as 
Research Ethics Committees (RECs), Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), Ethics Committees 
(ECs), or by other similar names.  
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In recent times, the responsibilities and authority of REBs have been heavily debated and 
subjected to scrutiny creating an ongoing under-protection-over-protection argument (Pullman, 
2002). Civil libertarians and human rights advocates have argued that research subjects are 
under-protected (Kohn, 1984)—in that the institution charged with the primary responsibility of 
protecting human research subjects (REBs) does not adequately protect research subjects when a 
study is ongoing. For instance, Caplan (1982) points out that:  
"the primary problem with the system of IRB review, in both its old and new guises, is 
that it devotes too much time to the production of paper promises and almost no time to 
the enforcement, investigation, or general assurance that the promises will be kept” (p. 8).  
 
While the initial review of research by REBs is important and proper, REBs offer very little 
protection to research subjects after initial review (Elliott, 2015). 
Researchers, on the other hand, have argued that REBs over-protect research subjects, 
and this over-protection slows the pace of research (Kohn, 1984). Thus, the REB system stifles 
the progress of scientific inquiry. In some instances, the activities of REBs have also been 
described as a threat to academic freedom (Thomson, Elgin, Hyman, Rubin & Knight, 2006).  
Unfortunately, REBs have been subjected to such pressures regarding the over- 
protection and under-protection debate from various stakeholders. However, REBs have a moral 
imperative to continue to protect human subjects after the initial review of protocols.  
It is worth noting that, REBs were created decades ago in a research environment that 
was not as complex as it is now. This research environment has expanded in many regards 
(Pullman, 2002). For instance, researchers are now under intense and increasing pressure to 
secure funding from private industry sponsors as government funding for clinical research 
continues to decrease in countries like the US and Canada (Taylor, 2010). These financial 
pressures on researchers to attract grants and the pressures to make new discoveries could be 
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partly responsible for the many cases of misconduct and unethical practices that have occurred in 
clinical research in recent decades. Examples of such misconduct and unethical cases include 
Paolo Macchiarini’s synthetic trachea experimentation which resulted in 7 deaths out of the 9 
patients who had the transplantation between 2011 and 2014. Macchiarini did not even seek the 
approval of his university’s ethical review board, nor were his patients/subjects fully informed of 
the potential risks (Kremer, 2016; Rasko & Power, 2017). In a San Diego study which recruited 
veterans between 2014 and 2016, the research team removed extra pieces of liver from at least 9 
veterans without informing them of this procedure or that the procedure could increase their risk 
of bleeding (Racino & Castello, 2019). Also, Pfizer’s 1996 Trovan study in Nigeria resulted in 
the death of 11 children, and several other participants had severe consequences like blindness, 
deafness, and lameness (Stephen, 2006; Willyard, 2007). Later in chapter 3, I discuss a few other 
examples of cases that stained the integrity of the research enterprise.  
The new research environment is also profit-driven, and therefore, we cannot have a lax 
system that is susceptible to misconduct. The danger of this lax oversight system is that altruistic 
research subjects will be at risk of ending up as victims, just like Macchiarini’s subjects (Kremer, 
2016; Rasko & Power, 2017), the San Diego veterans (Racino & Castello, 2019) and the 
vulnerable children who took part in the Trovan study (Stephen, 2006; Willyard, 2007). In the 
end, the already eroding trust the public has in clinical research would be blown away. Much 
more crucial, it is at this point where there are pressures coming from the stakeholders, where 
cases of misconduct are increasing, and public trust in the research enterprise is eroding that 
“IRB members will either raise themselves up to meet the challenge or, if they do not, the IRB 
system will be properly swept away” (Icenogle, 2003, p. 63). 
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1.3 Thesis Position 
This thesis is about the ethical necessity of ongoing REB monitoring while research is 
being conducted, after the phase of initial review of protocols. This thesis focuses on REBs and 
how they should increase and maintain the quality and morality of an ongoing study. I address 
how REBs should best protect human subjects who are contributing to scientific knowledge as a 
way of ensuring integrity in research. The REB’s initial review of research is a widely accepted 
practice, but what happens after the protocol approval? Do subjects enroll in clinical research at 
their own risk without adequate protection while the study is ongoing? 
My overall position is that the continual monitoring function or oversight responsibility 
of REBs, as it is currently understood in many jurisdictions, is inadequate given the level of 
research misconduct and the recurrence of preventable scandals and unethical practices. I draw 
on empirical evidence and normative analysis/claims to make a normative argument against the 
current oversight mechanisms and provide guidance on how REBs should continually monitor 
clinical research. The mechanisms for monitoring research have not much changed since the 
1980s. These mechanisms for ensuring research integrity and the safety of subjects are 
inadequate not only in the North American context but in many other jurisdictions like Ghana, 
South Africa, Zimbabwe and Nigeria. REBs as institutions responsible for the protection and 
welfare of human research subjects should ensure that subjects who are contributing to scientific 
knowledge are being adequately protected to ensure their safety, the overall integrity of the 
research project, and prevent the likelihood of research misconduct.  
I define research misconduct as “behavior by a researcher, intentional or not, that falls 
short of good ethical and scientific standard” (Scott-Lichter, 2006). Research misconduct can 
include the violation of standard research practices and the failure to comply with regulatory 
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requirements. Among research ethics violations are the failure to obtain informed consent, the 
failure to obtain initial approval, the failure to obtain approval for amendments to protocols, the 
failure to report conflicts of interests, and the failure to report adverse events. Falsifying data or 
documents and maltreatment of research subjects are also research ethics violations (Baucher, 
Fontanarosa, Flanagin, & Thornton, 2018; Sheehan, 2007; Swartz, 2012). These forms of 
misconduct could be based on ignorance, sloppiness, or malice (Woollen, n.d.). However, the 
recurrence of some of the unethical practices is a cause for concern and a reason to strengthen 
our monitoring systems. As Shalala (2000) puts it, “if we are to keep testing new medicines and 
approaches to curing diseases, we cannot compromise the trust and willingness of patients to 
participate in clinical trials. Any deterioration in the protective foundation causes direct harm to 
human research subjects and indirect harm to the reputations of the investigators, their academic 
institutions, and the entire research community” (p. 809).  
As I have already stated, the challenge with the current REB oversight system, which was 
created several decades ago, is that the clinical research space has changed and expanded in 
many regards (Pullman, 2002). However, the oversight system has not received the 
corresponding reforms, leaving an imbalance between the rate at which the research enterprise is 
expanding and the current oversight system. In practice, the oversight system has been 
ineffective to some extent and, therefore, inadequate. Interestingly, there have been calls for even 
lesser oversight, suggesting the current oversight is paternalistic. In the end, we may be failing 
our altruistic subjects. We must, therefore, identify ways of protecting subjects when research is 
ongoing and ensuring overall integrity as a way of restoring public confidence and trust in 
clinical research.  
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I focus on clinical research primarily because much of research funding from all sources 
(public and private) goes into clinical research compared to other research fields like 
anthropology and sociology. For instance, in the 2018 Canadian budget, the Federal government 
allocated more research funds to the Canadian Institutes of Health Research ($354.7 million)1 as 
compared to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council ($215.5 million) (Owen, 
2018). Also, unlike the other areas of research, the clinical research enterprise receives a higher 
percentage of its funds from private sponsors (Lexchin, Bero, Djulbegovic, & Clark, 2003). 
These private sponsors have other interests (mostly commercial), which may pose a significant 
threat to the enterprise’s integrity (Wendler, 2017). That is, there are economic forces within the 
clinical research enterprise creating incentives for misconduct and other unethical practices.  
In this thesis, I do not intend to further overburden REBs, neither do I suggest sponsors 
and researchers are unethical individuals who intend to harm research subjects. However, the 
coming chapters will demonstrate that while government agencies and private sponsors are 
spending billions of dollars on clinical research around the world, the lives of millions of people, 
including human research subjects, are put at risk (Icenogle, 2003). Therefore, research subjects 
should be adequately protected while a study is being conducted, that is, from initiation until 
completion. There is a need for REBs to balance the need for scientific knowledge against the 
moral duty to protect research subjects adequately. 
 
1.4 Chapter Summaries 
 
1 The term ‘clinical research’ is broadly used here to include biomedical research.  
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In this chapter, I have introduced the thesis with a highlight of the importance of clinical 
research and its current ethical challenges. I have argued that REBs, as institutions responsible 
for the welfare of human research subjects, should ensure that subjects are adequately protected 
until the completion of the research.  
In chapter two, I present the recommendations of various influential research ethics 
guidelines regarding REB monitoring of research activities. The objective of this chapter is to 
help the research community rethink the systems of human research subject protection by 
presenting the various guidelines and policy statements and the relevant literature on the ethics 
and procedures of REB post-review monitoring. I make references in particular to the Canadian 
Tri-Council Policy Statement (TCPS2), the US Common Rule (45 CFR 46), the Council for 
International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) guideline, the International Council 
for Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH-GCP) 
guideline, the World Health Organization (WHO) guideline, the Nuremberg Code and the 
Declaration of Helsinki.  
Monitoring of research after initial review is not outside the mandate of REBs, as various 
commentators like deLanda (2011) have argued. I summarize the REBs continuous oversight 
mechanisms using Cooper’s (1984) description of how REBs monitor research.  
In chapter three, by drawing on the information presented in the previous chapter, my 
objective is to point out the inadequacy of current methods of REB monitoring. I provide an 
understanding of why the current oversight systems and REBs’ continual monitoring 
responsibilities have been inadequate, despite policies and regulations like the Common Rule, 
the TCPS2, the ICH-GCP, and many others. This chapter provides an argument focusing on the 
prevalence of research misconduct, recent instances of gross research misconduct, and the 
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centrality of researcher self-reporting for REB oversight, to defend the idea that adequate REB 
post-initial-review monitoring requires greater REB involvement.  
The objective of the final chapter is to provide a framework for active research 
monitoring and to provide an ethical justification for a more proactive model of continual 
monitoring of research. In chapter four, I also outline what the increased monitoring that I am 
proposing should consist of, and the practical constraints associated with executing these 
monitoring functions. Here, I encourage a constructive reform that will enhance the oversight 
system, which is currently inadequate in several ways. The argument I make in this chapter is 













CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH ETHICS GUIDELINES ON REB MONITORING 
2.1 Influential Research Ethics Guidelines  
Towards the second half of the twentieth century, the amount of research with human 
subjects increased significantly due to the growth of universities and the potential application of 
discoveries, prompting the proposal of ethics codes to protect research subjects (Schneider, 
2005). At that same time, there were many ethical issues concerning human subject research, 
which called for government intervention through the development of regulations, guidelines and 
policy documents (Breault, 2006; Schneider, 2005).  
Many of the guidelines, regulations, and policy statements produced during this period 
were in response to disastrous historical research events (Horner & Minifie, 2011). Indeed, such 
disastrous events mark the reference point in modern Bioethics. As Caplan (1989) puts it, “the 
whole discipline of biomedical ethics arises from the ashes of the Holocaust” (as cited in Rosner 
et al., 1991, p. 54). For instance, the Nuremberg Code was developed as a result of the trial of 
Nazi physicians for crimes committed against prisoners of war and those in concentration camps 
who were used as research subjects. Similarly, the Common Rule, which is an influential US 
government regulation on research ethics, came out in the aftermath of the Tuskegee syphilis 
experiment. The Tuskegee study is one of the biggest scandals in the history of research 
involving human subjects. The Tuskegee scandal led to US Congressional hearings, which led to 
demands for greater research oversight and eventually to new legislation and regulations on 
research with human subjects (Brown, 2017; Rice, 2008).  
Over the years, several international and national commissions and agencies like National 
Institutes of Health (NIH), World Health Organization (WHO), Council for International 
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Organizations of Medical Sciences  (CIOMS), United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 
United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS), and several others within the 
biomedical scientific community have contributed valuable concepts and approaches to the 
protection of human research subjects. The formation of institutional REBs is one of these 
concepts— to assure the protection of human research subjects as a direct result of the history of 
terrible and unfortunate research abuses (Breault, 2006). REBs usually consist of at least five 
members including a community representative and other individuals with diverse expertise in 
relevant research disciplines, ethics, and law (45 CFR 46.107; CIOMS, 2016, guideline 23, p. 86; 
TCPS2, 2014, Article 6.4; WHO, 2000, p. 3). The REB is mandated to review the “ethical 
acceptability of studies on behalf of the institutions, including approving, rejecting, proposing 
modifications, or terminating any ongoing research involving human subjects within the 
jurisdiction of the institution” (TCPS, 2014, Article 6.3, p. 69). Currently, in many jurisdictions, 
research cannot proceed without REB approval. 
The oversight and monitoring of research after initial REB review is unequivocally 
within the mandate of REBs (Weijer, Shapiro, Fuks, Glass, & Skrutkowska, 1995). Almost all 
ethical and regulatory guidelines, policy statements and standards grant REBs the authority to 
approve, require modifications or disapprove research, to observe (or monitor) or have a third 
party observe (or monitor) the consent process and the research and to suspend or terminate 
approval of research (Cooper & McNair, 2014; Department of Health and Human Services 
[DHHS], 2018; TCPS2, 2014). REBs are to act in the interest of potential research subjects by 
taking into account relevant international regulatory guidelines and applicable national or local 
laws (CIOMS, 2016). These authorities focus the REB on both proposed and ongoing research. 
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These authorities also suggest that REBs protect research subjects and oversee research and, 
therefore, when researchers are non-compliant, the REBs can suspend or terminate the ongoing 
research.  
There are several policy statements and guidelines regulating the conduct of research 
with human subjects. These include the Nuremberg Code, the TCPS2, the Common Rule, the 
CIOMS guidelines, WHO guidelines, the ICH-GCP guideline, and the Helsinki declaration. The 
TCPS2 and the Common Rule are applicable in Canada and the US respectively. The CIOMS 
guideline, the WHO guideline, the ICH-GCP guideline and the Declaration of Helsinki are, 
however, not country-specific. These influential research ethics guidelines provide some 
recommendations regarding REB monitoring of research activities. Below I will outline the 
recommendations and requirements regarding post-initial-review monitoring found in each of 
these documents. 
 
2.1.1 Nuremberg Code  
The principles and guidelines for conducting human research were first developed as the 
Nuremberg Code after the trial of the Nazi war criminals in 1947 (Rice, 2008). German 
physicians, among others, were prosecuted for conducting unethical, painful, and deadly 
experiments on thousands of war prisoners during World War II (Weindling, von Villiez, 
Loewenau, & Farron, 2016). The Nuremberg Code is an expression of the basic requirements for 
conducting research in a manner that respects the fundamental rights of human research subjects. 
The basic elements of the Nuremberg Code, including voluntary informed consent, favourable 
14 
risk/benefit analysis, and the right to withdraw without any repercussions, became the foundation 
for subsequent research ethics codes and regulations (Rice, 2008). The Nuremberg Code has ten 
articles, and articles 1 to 8 can be described to fit the initial review processes. Article 9 
emphasizes on research subject’s right to withdraw from an ongoing study without any penalty 
or repercussions. Also, article 10 states that researchers should be prepared to terminate their 
study if there is enough reason to believe that continuation of the study will likely have greater 
negative impact on subjects (Rice, 2008; The Nuremberg Code, 1949; United States Adjutant 
General's Department, 1947). At the time of the Nuremberg Code, REBs were nonexistent; 
therefore, researchers were required to self-monitor. 
 
2.1.2 Declaration of Helsinki 
The Declaration of Helsinki was developed in 1964 by the World Medical Association 
(WMA) as a policy statement of ethical principles for medical research with human subjects, 
including research on identifiable human material and data. The Declaration has since undergone 
several revisions. It was built on the principles of the Nuremberg Code (Rice, 2008). The 
Declaration is addressed primarily to physician-researchers, however, the WMA (2018) 
encourages other researchers who are involved in medical research involving human subjects to 
adopt these principles.  
The Helsinki declaration states that research proposals must be submitted to REBs for 
consideration, comment, guidance, and approval prior to the commencement of a study (WMA, 
2018, point 23). Risks and burdens of all medical research involving human subjects must be 
assessed and compared with anticipated benefits. Again, the Declaration highlights that there 
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should be measures to minimize the risks associated with the research and that the researcher 
must continuously monitor the risks to subjects (WMA, 2018, point 17).  
The declaration emphasizes that REBs must have the right to monitor ongoing studies 
(WMA, 2018, point 23). However, the onus is on researchers to monitor their research. That is, 
researchers must provide monitoring information to REBs, especially information about serious 
adverse events, and when changes are made to the study protocol, REBs must be notified and 
must get the board’s approval (WMA, 2018, point 23). The Declaration also suggests that 
research must take into consideration the laws and regulations of the country or countries in 
which research is being conducted as well as applicable international norms and standards, but 
these must not reduce or eliminate any of the protections for research subjects outlined in the 
declaration (point 10). 
 
2.1.3 Operational Guidelines for Ethics Committees That Review Biomedical Research  
The World Health Organization (WHO), in 2000, developed the Operational Guidelines 
for Ethics Committees That Review Biomedical Research. According to this guideline, Ethics 
Committees (ECs, in the language of the document) are responsible for reviewing proposed 
studies before the start of research (WHO, 2000, p. 1). After initial approval, ECs are to ensure 
regular review of the ethics of ongoing research. ECs must also communicate clearly the 
schedule or plan of an ongoing review to the researcher (WHO, 2000, p. 16.). The guideline 
recommends that,  
ECs should establish a follow-up procedure for following the progress of all studies for 
which a positive decision has been reached, from the time the decision was taken until the 
termination of the research. The ongoing lines of communication between the EC and the 
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applicant should be clearly specified. The follow-up procedure should take the following 
into consideration: 
    the follow-up review intervals should be determined by the nature and the events of 
research projects, though each protocol should undergo a follow-up review at least once a 
year;  
    the following instances or events require the follow-up review of a study:  
a. any protocol amendment likely to affect the rights, safety, and/or well-being of the 
research participants or the conduct of the study;  
b. serious and unexpected adverse events related to the conduct of the study or study 
product, and the response taken by investigators, sponsors, and regulatory agencies;  
c. any event or new information that may affect the benefit/risk ratio of the study (p. 16-
17).  
 
2.1.4 Tri-Council Policy Statement (TCPS2) 
The Tri-Council Policy Statement (TCPS2, 2014) is a joint policy by three federal 
research agencies, that is, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), the Natural 
Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) of Canada and the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada. Initially developed as the TCPS (TCPS1) in 
1998, the TCPS has been revised many times, leading to the development of the 2014 TCPS2. 
The TCPS2 states that these Agencies have a continuing obligation to the people of Canada by 
promoting the ethical conduct of research with human subjects and also serve as a guide to 
researchers conducting research in Canada (TCPS2, 2014). The TCPS2 (2014) is a standard for 
the ethical conduct of research in Canada. Therefore, researchers and institutions in Canada, 
including REBs, are required to be guided by the TCPS2. For this thesis, I focus on sections of 
the 2014 TCPS2 related to health research. 
The TCPS2 sets out “operational guidelines for REBs and research ethics review, both 
initially and throughout the course of the research project” (p. 67). The TCPS2 makes a clear 
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distinction between continuous monitoring and continuous review, describing continuous 
monitoring as a responsibility of the researcher and continuous review as that of the REB 
(Article 6.14).  
Article 6.14 of the TCPS2 states that it is the researchers’ responsibility to monitor their 
research to ensure that it is conducted ethically and to ensure compliance. Researchers are also 
required to report unanticipated issues (minor or serious) or events (short or long-term), changes 
to the protocol, and also to ensure that the research team has good knowledge in the ethical 
conduct of research. In addition, Article 11.7 of the TCPS2 states that researchers shall provide 
the REB with a plan for monitoring the safety of subjects to assess safety concerns and to protect 
the ongoing safety of subjects. 
Again, Article 6.14 states that research is subject to continuing research ethics review 
from the date of initial REB approval until the study is completed. REBs have the authority to 
determine the term of approval, and the level at which continuing ethics review will occur, and 
as with initial review, continuous ethics review can be full REB review or review by delegated 
members. However, the minimum requirement is that, continuous research ethics review shall 
consist of an annual report (for a study more than one year) and an end of study report (for a 
study lasting a year or less). For studies whose start or end dates are difficult to establish, the 
REB shall work with researchers to determine “a reasonable timeline for continuing ethics 
review, and for determining the completion date dependent on the discipline and method of 
research” (Article 6.14, TCPS2, 2014). This schedule for continuing ethics review may be 
adjusted throughout the life of the project. 
The TCPS2 sums up continuous monitoring as such; 
 In accordance with the core principle of Concern for Welfare, it is a key responsibility of 
researchers and REBs to ensure that, as clinical trials proceed, the risks to participants 
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remain in the acceptable range, and the safety of participants is monitored. Articles 11.7 
and 11.8 address researchers’ responsibility to include a safety monitoring plan in their 
proposal submitted for REB review, and their responsibility to ensure that any new 
information that may affect participant welfare or consent is shared with the REB and 
participants (see also Articles 6.15 and 6.16). Article 11.9 addresses the REB’s 
responsibility to have procedures in place to receive and respond to reports of new 
information, including, but not limited to, safety data, unanticipated issues and newly 
discovered risks (see the Application of Article 11.8 for an expanded definition) (p. 
159).  
In summary, the researcher must monitor the research and submit a monitoring report for the 
REB to review. 
 
2.1.5 International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Humans Use 
The ICH- GCP guideline was adopted in 1996, taking into account good clinical practice 
standards in Canada, the US, Australia, Japan, the Nordic countries and the WHO (ICH-GCP, 
2016). The latest version of this document is the 2016 version. Health Canada adopted the ICH-
GCP guideline, and therefore, Canada adheres to the ICH-GCP guideline together with its 
TCPS2 (McCarthy, 2008).  
Like the other influential ethics guidelines, this guideline spells out the responsibilities of 
REBs/RECs/IRBs/ECs. The ICH-GCP provides a guide on continuous review and monitoring of 
clinical research.  According to this guideline, REBs shall “safeguard the rights, safety and well-
being of all trial subjects,” but special attention should be paid to vulnerable research subjects in 
the form of providing additional protection (ICH-GCP, 2016, p. 10). Also, aside from the initial 
review and subsequent decision on the review, REBs shall conduct a continuous review of 
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ongoing studies at appropriate timelines according to the study’s degree of risks but not less than 
once per year (ICH-GCP, 1996). REBs rely on researchers to continuously review their studies.  
However, when it comes to continuous monitoring, the ICH-GCP guideline states that it 
is the responsibility of research sponsors to monitor studies. Practically, the sponsor appoints an 
independent monitor, the Data and Safety Monitoring Board (DSMB), who must have adequate 
scientific knowledge required to monitor the study. The monitor who is independent of the study 
acts as the main line of communication between sponsors and the investigator. If monitoring 
should reveal issues related to non-compliance and unacceptable risks, the sponsor is notified by 
the monitor, and the former then terminates the study and notifies regulatory authorities like 
REBs (ICH-GCP, 2016).  
In summary, REBs, whose primary responsibility is to ensure the safety of research 
subjects, may not have any direct interactions with trial monitors (i.e., DSMBs) when the study 
is ongoing (Romero, 2013).  
 
2.1.6 International Ethical Guidelines for Health-related Research Involving Humans  
The International Ethical Guidelines for Health-related Research Involving Humans was 
prepared by the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in 
collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) in 1982 (with its latest version 
adopted in 2016). CIOMS represents a “substantial proportion of the biomedical scientific 
community through its member organizations, which include many of the biomedical disciplines, 
national academies of sciences and medical research councils” (CIOMS, 2016, “Our Mission”). 
20 
CIOMS (2016) seeks to “advance public health through guidance on health research including 
ethics, medical product development, and safety” (“Our Mission”). The CIOMS guideline was 
designed to be of use, particularly in developing countries.  
According to the International Ethical Guidelines for Health-related Research Involving 
Humans, REBs must be authorized to monitor ongoing studies (CIOMS, 2016, p. 90). 
Researchers are to provide relevant information, especially information about any serious 
adverse events, to REBs to permit monitoring of research. Again, as part of monitoring ongoing 
studies, deviations and violations must be reported to REBs (CIOMS, 2016). For instance, the 
researcher must report to the REB all changes in the protocol, including changes in the inclusion 
and exclusion criteria or changes in the sample size. These must be reported or the researcher 
must submit an amendment for review in the case of protocol deviations. Protocol violations can 
significantly affect the wellbeing and interests of research subjects and also impact the scientific 
validity and integrity of the data. Concerning protocol violations, CIOMS (2016) states that 
REBs must ensure that subjects are informed, and provisions must be made for the protection of 
subjects’ safety and welfare. Again, if a researcher fails to submit a protocol to an REB for 
subsequent review, then this type of omission or failure is a serious violation of ethical standards 
unless it falls within conditions for exemptions from continuous review (CIOMS, 2016).   
 
2.1.7 The Common Rule (45 CFR 46) 
The infamous Tuskegee syphilis experiment (1932-1972) which enrolled poor African-
Americans is the most important single promoter of the development of human research ethics 
guidelines in the United States of America (Mandal, Acharya & Parija, 2011). Participants of the 
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Tuskegee study were unethically observed to assess the progression of syphilis without any 
therapeutic intervention, even at a time when there was a proven cure (Wurtzurg, 2016). Post-
Tuskegee, there was a revolution leading to the United States Congress passing the National 
Research Act, which established the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects 
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research in 1978 (DHHS, 2018). The Commission, in its 
recommendations, outlined the basic ethical principles in research involving human subjects, 
known as The Belmont Report.  
The Common Rule (45 CFR 46, Subpart A of the Federal Policy for the Protection of 
Human Subjects), which is the current U.S. system of protection for human research subjects, is 
heavily influenced by the 1979 Belmont Report (DHHS, 2018). The Common Rule represents 
the result of more than 40 years of development and discussions of the underlying ethical 
principles and guidelines for the conduct of research using human subjects, starting with the 
Nuremberg Code in 1947. It was first published in 1991 and has undergone several revisions 
with the latest version published in 2018 (Code of Federal Regulations, 2018).  
The Common Rule mandates that IRBs (REBs) provide a continued review of studies at 
least once per year (Code of Federal Regulations, 2018). The IRB shall track and schedule 
continuous review of approved research to prevent lapses in IRB (REB) approval. The researcher 
is mandated to submit a yearly report to the IRB outlining the progress of the study, including 
changes to the protocol and reports on other adverse events (however, serious adverse events are 
reported immediately). The Common Rule similarly states that an IRB (REB) shall conduct a 
continuing review of research at appropriate intervals according to the degree of risk, but this 
should not be less than once per year. Again, IRBs (REBs) shall have the authority to observe or 
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have a third party observe the consent process and the research at large (Code of Federal 
Regulations, 2018).  
 
2.2 How do REBs currently monitor research? 
REBs have a critical role in maintaining the ethical integrity of a study’s post-initial-
review —by monitoring to ensure that research participants receive safe and ethical treatment 
during research, provide fully informed consent, minimize conflict of interest (Shekelle et al., 
2012), and also ensure overall study compliance. However, in practice, the processes and 
procedures that are in place to satisfy the requirements for monitoring have been inadequate. 
Cooper (1984) describes ways REBs monitor research after the research has been initially 
approved. Cooper’s (1984) description represents a summary of the various policy statements, 
regulations and guidelines on continuous monitoring of clinical research. 
First, REBs often have a complaint procedure where research subjects can directly report 
to REBs about some unexpected risks or if they have been unfairly treated or unnecessarily 
exposed to risks (Cooper, 1984). This procedure is usually stated in the consent forms, indicating 
that research subjects should directly contact REBs if they have any complaints or questions.  
REBs typically monitor research to conduct ‘for-cause investigations’ whenever there is a 
complaint of mistreatment by a subject. However, Elliott (2017b) critiques this monitoring 
process by arguing that very often, the oversight body (REBs) fails to interview the research 
subject who filed the complaint of mistreatment. Elliott (2017b) further argues that REBs often 
rely on written documents or records which are always written by research teams or staff 
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members, to investigate subject complaints. However, research teams may not document all 
research-related harms or unfair treatments to subjects (Elliott, 2017b). Elliot criticizes this 
monitoring mechanism and suggests the only reasonable way is to interview subjects who file 
complaints as part of the ‘for-cause investigations.’ 
Secondly, there is a mechanism in place for researchers to report unexpected events or 
accidents to REBs when the study is ongoing (Cooper, 1984). This mechanism includes 
reporting newly identified risk information or harms (such as adverse events), reporting 
information suggesting clinical equipoise does not exist and reporting unanticipated problems 
involving therapeutic efficacy to the REB. These reports are designed to be sent regularly to 
REBs, or immediately after the adverse events occur. REBs can then decide on the implications 
for the study, including suspending or shutting down research that leads to unexpected and 
serious harm to subjects.  
Lastly, REBs conduct annual or continuing reviews to determine whether there have been 
changes in procedures. These changes include changes in sample size, recruitment challenges 
(not meeting recruitment targets) and changes in exclusion or inclusion criteria. REBs conduct 
the continuing review of already approved research projects at appropriate intervals determined 
by the REB (not less than once annually). REBs use such reports to determine whether changes 
in the approval of an ongoing research project are reasonable and acceptable (Saver, 2004). 
Continual review is conducted at least once a year, or for studies lasting less than one year, it is 
conducted at the end of the study. REBs have the authority to suspend or terminate research 
projects that fail to adhere to the requirements for initial approval. 
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The various guidelines and policy statements, such as the TCPS2, Common Rule and 
CIOMS, and the existing literature on REB monitoring, match Cooper’s description. That is, 
Cooper’s (1984) description of how REBs monitor research is synonymous with the current 
oversight mechanisms stated in the various guidelines. These policies and guidelines focus 
mainly on an aspect of continuous monitoring, such as continuous review by REBs. 
Commentators like DeLande (2011) argue that it is the responsibility of the researcher to monitor 
a study and submit the monitoring report to the REB for continuous review. Thus, study-related 
events, including newly identified risks and adverse events, are reported to the REB for them to 
decide on the continuation of the study. However, there are many documented cases in which 
researchers failed to report protocol changes and newly identified risks and harms to REBs. Such 
cases were only exposed through whistleblowing (Fang et al., 2012; Kornfeld, 2012) —
underscoring that these monitoring mechanisms may be inadequate.  
Overall, these current monitoring mechanisms, policy statements, guidelines, and 
regulations are inadequate in ensuring subject safety when research is ongoing and in ensuring 
the overall integrity of research. Many commentators, including Elliott (2015), have described 
the REB’s oversight system as a complete failure because of the inadequacy of these systems and 
mechanisms in protecting research subjects when a study is ongoing. These monitoring 
mechanisms also make research very vulnerable to misconduct and scientific fraud. 
In the next chapter, I present an in-depth argument and evidence that these monitoring 
mechanisms are inadequate. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT METHODS OF REB 
MONITORING  
The REB system of human research subject protection came into existence in the 1970s 
(Elliott, 2015; Fleischman, 2005; Rice, 2008). During that time, there were increased pressures 
on universities, teaching hospitals and individual researchers to seek pharma-corporate 
sponsorship for their research projects as federal research funds had started to decrease (Kohn, 
1984). Many of those with interests in the research enterprise at that time had argued that the 
most significant threat to subjects and the research enterprise came from particularly 
‘overambitious’ university researchers, who were likely to pay less attention to ethical standards 
and the safety of research subjects (Elliott, 2015). Consequently, mechanisms like the REB 
system were established to protect research subjects (Godfrey et al., 2014; Rice, 2008; Weijer, 
2001).  
Primarily, the challenge with the REB oversight system is that the research enterprise 
have not been cognizant of the inadequacy of policy infrastructures for protecting research 
subjects, public interest, and overall industry integrity in this new era and environment of 
dominant corporate and pharma-industry sponsorship of clinical research (Fleischman, 2005). 
The existing international and national policies, guidelines, and practices have not sufficiently 
changed to consider these new circumstances. REBs oversight systems are believed to be 
particularly inadequate in this new era (Emanuel et al., 2004). Research with human subjects is, 
therefore, often described to be vulnerable to misconduct and fraud due to the overall inadequacy 
of mechanisms in place for oversight and monitoring responsibilities.  
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In this chapter, I provide evidence that REBs are failing at their ongoing monitoring 
responsibilities. I draw on the prevalence of research misconduct, instances of gross research 
misconduct, and the centrality of researcher self-reporting for REB oversight to defend the idea 
that adequate REB post-initial-review monitoring requires greater REB involvement, rather than 
relying solely on trust or the researcher’s assurances.  
 
3.1 How extensive is the problem of misconduct in medical research?  
There has been a staggering increase in the amount of research with human subjects in 
the last two decades (Bajpai, 2013; Ghersi, 2004). Similarly, although there has always been 
misconduct, fraud, and corruption in the research enterprise (Bissey, 2009), the rate of research 
misconduct and scientific fraud has been staggering (Gupta, 2013) and has increased in recent 
times (Roberts & John, 2014) despite the existence of policies and regulations on human 
research subject protection like the CIOMS guideline, the ICH-GCP guideline, the Common 
Rule (45 CRF 46) and the TCPS2. Below, I present evidence of the increasing rate of research 
misconduct.  
 
3.1.1 Incidence of retractions  
Retraction of published research articles has always been a disturbing trend in clinical 
research. Also, its surge in recent times (Steen, Casadevall, & Fang, 2013; Steen, 2011) has been 
a great course for concern. For instance, the overall rate of retraction increased from around 40 
per year in 2000, to about 1500 per year in recent years (as cited in Worthington, 2019). Also, 
between 1997 and 2001, PubMed retracted fewer than 100 published articles for reasons related 
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to fraud and misconduct, as compared to over 400 retractions between 2007 and 2011 (Fang, 
Steen, & Casadevall, 2012). To add another example, the rate of retraction of published 
psychiatric articles because of ethical breaches and research misconduct increased from 3.56 per 
10,000 in 2005 to 49.25 per 10,000 in 2012 (Balhara & Mishra, 2015). This increase occurred 
despite additional protections and requirements within research ethics guidelines meant to 
protect mentally ill subjects (Balhara & Mishra, 2015; Jain et al., 2017), like the various 
regulations requiring researchers to provide enough justification for using mentally ill persons as 
subjects, and the need for a substitute decision-maker to provide consent for subjects with 
diminished autonomy because of the likelihood of deception and maltreatment.  
The rate of retractions of research articles per year increased significantly in the last 
decades (Steen et al., 2013; Steen, 2011). This increasing rate of retractions has been subjected to 
different interpretations. For instance, Fanelli (2013) attributes the increase in the rate of 
retractions of published articles to the efficiency of the system, and not to an increase in 
misconduct. Fanelli’s argument could be partly true, in that some aspects of oversight may have 
improved, leading to more poorly designed, conducted, or otherwise unethical research being 
caught. This improved oversight might have resulted in increased retractions of published 
articles, even though most of these retractions are a result of whistleblowers, and in some cases, 
attentive reviewers (Fang et al., 2012; Kornfeld, 2012).  
However, the fact is, the increasing rate of retraction of published articles is an indication 
of a weak system that fails to identify some of these unethical practices when the research is 
ongoing. The retraction of published articles explicitly indicates that the study or research has 
been completed and results have been disseminated. The retraction of published articles results 
from the inability of the current oversight system to detect unethical practices and misconduct 
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when a study is ongoing. That is, these unethical practices are not being noticed or caught while 
the study is ongoing or being conducted. Ultimately, published articles based on poorly designed, 
conducted, and otherwise unethical research practices may later be detected and retracted (even 
though most unethical practices are undetected), but that does not have any correlation with 
improved oversight when research is ongoing.  
Also, assuming Fanelli’s (2013) argument is wholly correct, that is, the increase in known 
cases of misconduct (resulting in an increase in retractions) is due to the current passive 
oversight system, then a more proactive oversight will do the research enterprise greater good. 
That is, misconduct and unethical practices will be noticed early and addressed, preventing the 
overall consequences of misconduct and subsequent retractions.   
In the long run, instances of research misconduct (whether it leads to retractions or not) 
“harm patients, distort the evidence base, misdirect research effort, waste funds, and damage 
public trust in science” (Godlee, & Wager, 2012, p. 1). For instance, a US study showed that 
every retraction as a result of research misconduct costs the US taxpayer almost $400,000 (Stern, 
Grant, & Fang, 2014), and more worrying is the fact that the damage these retractions continues 
to have on public trust in clinical research is incalculable. Also, the average time for a published 
article to be retracted is approximately 33 months (Steen et al., 2013). Between the time of 
publication and retraction, these articles are continually being cited in other studies (one article 
which the Lancet retracted has had 758 citations) (Fang et al., 2012). Before retraction, they 
might even serve as evidence or the basis for clinical interventions in some cases (Kornfeld, 
2012)—as happened in the UK, where an influential guideline on intravenous fluid therapy had 
referenced a poorly conducted/unethical study (Marcus, 2018).  
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3.1.2 Field evidence (Monitored cases) 
There is evidence that research misconduct is common in Canada. A report on research 
integrity by the consulting firm Hickling Arthurs Low (HAL) showed that the 29 Canadian 
institutions (including universities and colleges, medical research organizations and government 
science-based departments and agencies) that responded to questions on research misconduct 
collectively dealt with 39 cases of misconduct every year (HAL Report, 2009). 
Misconduct also occurs commonly in other jurisdictions. For instance, Ochieng, Ecuru, 
Nakwagala, and Kutyabami (2013) did a secondary review of site monitoring reports covering a 
period of four years from research studies in Uganda. This secondary review of monitoring 
reports (i.e., the retrospective study) revealed a range of misconduct that were initially identified 
by site monitors. For instance, violations of regulatory requirements for valid ethical approval 
(including researchers implementing changes to the protocol without REB review and 
subsequent approval of amendments) accounted for 25% of the misconduct. Instances of 
informed consent violations (including no informed consent form or no documentation to prove 
it) accounted for 36% of the misconduct. Violation of the rights and welfare of research subjects 
accounted for 28%, and not reporting serious adverse events to regulatory authorities accounted 
for 38% of misconduct. Even though Ochieng et al. (2013) reported that most of the monitored 
sites had the capacity to conduct these studies, ethical breaches and misconducts still occurred. 
 
3.1.3 Surveys 
Evidence from several studies shows that more than 40% of surveyed researchers or 
people involved in research knew of or engaged in some form of research misconduct (Geggie, 
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2001; Okonta & Rossouw, 2012; Ranstam et al., 2000). For instance, a survey involving 442 
biostatisticians (members of the International Society for Clinical Biostatistics, mostly from 
Europe and America) assessed the characteristics of fraud in medical research. In the survey, 
51% of the 163 biostatisticians that responded acknowledged knowing about fraudulent projects 
or knew about at least one fraudulent research project in the past ten years (Ranstam et al., 2000). 
Also, Geggie’s (2001) study in the UK to determine the prevalence of, and attitudes towards, 
observed and personal research misconduct among newly appointed medical consultants reported 
that 55.7% of these new medical consultants admitted to observing some form of research 
misconduct. In that same study, 5.7% of the new consultants admitted to previous research 
misconduct alluding to the fact that medical careers are competitive, and there are pressures to 
publish scientific works to enhance career prospects (Geggie, 2001). 
Okonta and Rossouw (2012) did a study on the prevalence of scientific misconduct 
among a group of researchers in Nigeria. The study was a survey of researchers who attended a 
scientific conference in 2010 in Nigeria. Out of a total of 150 administered questionnaires, 133 
were returned, giving a response rate of 88.7% (Okonta & Rossouw, 2012). They found that 
68.9% of the 133 respondents admitted to having committed at least one form of scientific 
misconduct. Among the various forms of scientific misconduct are the intentional protocol 
violations related to subject enrolment, intentional protocol violations pertaining to procedures, 
pressure from study sponsors to engage in unethical practices, plagiarism, falsification of data, 
selective dropping of ‘outlier’ cases, disagreement over authorship and falsification of 
biosketch/resume.  
Again, in Fanelli’s (2009) study, up to 33.7% of the scientists/researchers admitted to 
questionable research practices. When these scientists/researchers were also asked about the 
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behaviour of colleagues other than themselves, the rate for questionable research practices was 
up to 72%. This systematic review and meta-analysis on scientific misconduct involved 21 and 
18 studies, respectively, published between 1987 and 2008 in which researchers were asked 
about experiences of misconduct, that is if these researchers had committed or observed their 
colleagues commit scientific misconduct in the past (Fanelli, 2009). Sadly, most of these cases of 
misconduct go unreported. (Gupta, 2013). 
The increasing number of retracted publications, the evidence of research misconduct and 
fraud from surveys, meta-analysis, systematic review, and site monitoring reports are indicators 
of the state of the research enterprise and can be attributed to the overall inadequacy of 
monitoring systems. The research enterprise can imagine the number of research subjects whose 
lives were put at risk in the name of scientific inquiry based on the above estimates of research 
misconduct.  
Indeed, not all practices could be monitored by REBs. However, REBs (when adequately 
resourced) can monitor the violation of standard research practices such as failure to obtain 
informed consent, failure to obtain initial approval, failure to obtain approval for amendments to 
protocols, failure to report conflicts of interests, failure to report adverse events, failure to 
publish negative finding, failure to comply with regulatory requirements, falsifying data or 
documents and maltreatment of research subjects (Baucher et al., 2018; Sheehan, 2007; Swartz, 
2012). Thus, REBs’ active continual monitoring of ongoing research will prevent or detect early 
unethical research practices, thereby preventing the overall impact of misconduct and subsequent 
retractions (i.e., harm to patients, distortion of the evidence base, wasting of limited and 
competitive research funds, and damage to public trust in clinical research) (Godlee, & Wager, 
2012; Stern et al., 2014). I will provide further arguments for this position in chapter 4. 
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3.2 The size of the problem may be greater 
Despite the above evidence, the extent of the problem of research misconduct may be 
much worse than these estimates. Commentators like Fanelli (2009) have described these known 
cases of research misconduct as the ‘tip-of-the-iceberg’ (Fanelli, 2009), since it is obviously 
difficult to get answers from researchers/scientists for questions on deeds and practices that are 
“embarrassing, illegal and otherwise liable,”—such questions will most likely result in evasive 
and dodgy responses (George, 2016, p. 18; HAL report, 2009). Again, most cases of research 
misconduct are unreported by researchers (Gupta, 2013; Titus, Wells, & Rhoades, 2008) due “to 
an unwillingness to risk one’s reputation or sour relationships with colleagues , or simply an 
unwillingness to engage a process that can lead to frustration and additional work stress” (HAL 
Report, 2009, p. 57).  
The HAL report (2009) also raised concerns that research misconduct allegations are 
likely to be “swept under the carpet” by institutions (p. 57). Research institutions have incentives 
for sweeping research misconduct allegations under the carpet. There is potential harm to 
institutions (i.e., damage to the reputation of institutions) should unethical and fraudulent 
research lead to the commercialization of unsafe interventions, or should the public become 
aware of it. Some institutions are equally, if not more, interested in protecting their reputations 
than are individual researchers. Aside from the embarrassment research misconduct could bring 
to research institutions, sponsors may withdraw their grants, and these institutions may likely 
lose future research funding should these unethical practices and misconduct be made public 
(NSERC, 2012).  
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Quite clearly, even though it is challenging to measure misconduct, there is still enough 
evidence to suggest that the problem of research misconduct exists. These instances of 
misconduct and ethical breaches potentially put subjects at risk and damage the reputation of the 
research enterprise. 
 
3.3 Why are REBs not monitoring? 
Research misconduct is a reality the research enterprise cannot overlook (Gupta, 2013). 
REBs are charged with monitoring responsibilities with the goal of protecting research 
participants (Klitzman, 2011). Therefore, REBs are required to be more active when research is 
ongoing rather than “simply seeking a researcher's assurances” (Medical Research Council of 
Canada, 1987, p. 50). Unfortunately, the majority of REBs do not monitor studies to see how 
research procedures are being conducted. Thus, REBs very often fail at maintaining ongoing 
contact with research teams (Christakis, 1988; Elliot, 2015) since majority of institutions rely on 
volunteers and very limited funds. For instance, a study of Canadian REBs by the National 
Council on Ethics in Human Research (NCEHR) in 1995, found out that only 18% of surveyed 
REBs conducted some form of ongoing monitoring aside from annual review of studies (as cited 
in Weijer, 2001).  
Many Canadian REBs and IRBs in other jurisdictions like Ghana and Nigeria, similarly, 
do not fulfill the ongoing monitoring requirement because they employ only an annual review 
(Boateng, Ndebele, & Mwesiga-Kayongo, 2014; Weijer, 2001; Weijer et al., 1995) which should 
be only one aspect of continuous monitoring. In most developing countries, particularly, the 
oversight or monitoring system is even non-existent (Kilama, 2005). Researchers do what they 
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want to do —a probable reason why most pharma-sponsored clinical trials are now being 
conducted in the developing world (Robbins, 2017; Kilama, 2005).  
A significant challenge with the various policy statements and guidelines like the TCPS2, 
the CIOMS, and the Common Rule is that these guidelines outline responsibilities without much 
specificity. The goal of continual monitoring which is to ensure the ongoing safety and well-
being of subjects, the integrity of the data, and compliance with regulatory standards (Ansmann, 
Hecht, Henn, Leptien, & Stelzer, 2013), cannot be achieved if these regulatory requirements lack 
specificity or clarity. Even policies and guidelines (like the Common Rule and the Declaration of 
Helsinki) which state that continual monitoring is a responsibility of the REB lack the kind of 
specificity required of a guideline document that is supposed to provide direction or guidance. 
These policy statements and guidelines, therefore, do not provide optimal guidance. 
One of the observations by the Working Committee of the Interagency Advisory Panel on 
Research Ethics after the Oliveri scandal2 was that “some aspects of the TCPS lack explicit 
standards and specificity … and lack the precision and details found in other leading national and 
international documents” (Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics, 2008, p. 3). The 
committee recommended that there is a need to clarify the researcher’s duty of sharing updated 
information. This recommendation could be fulfilled by “clarifying the investigator’s continuing 
consent duties, by specifying the REB’s role in reviewing contracts that unduly restrict the 
sharing of information, and by clarifying one of the REB’s basic functions in initial and ongoing 





manage new information as part of ethics review, and to make these duties an explicit part of 
ongoing REB review)” (Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics, 2008, p. 3-4). The lack 
of specificity regarding the responsibilities of REBs when a study is ongoing is worrying and 
potentially dangerous for research subjects and a threat to the integrity of the research enterprise. 
The primary role of the REB, which is to protect the rights and welfare of human 
research subjects (Christakis, 1988; Garrard & Dawson, 2005; Godfrey et al., 2014; Morse, 
Califf, & Sugarman, 2001; Pullman, 2001; TCPS2, 2014; Weijer, 2001), has been shifted to the 
researcher. The various regulations and policies on monitoring, and the different forms of 
monitoring research as outlined by Cooper (1984) shift greater monitoring responsibility to the 
researcher. The researcher has a responsibility of subject protection and ensuring research 
integrity, but the overall responsibility of monitoring should not be shifted to the researcher, nor 
should REBs rely solely on researchers’ reports to continuously monitor research.  
All the guidelines and policies talk about the REB’s oversight responsibility in protecting 
research subjects throughout the study. However, the REB’s oversight responsibility (i.e., 
continuous review) is again highly dependent on self-reporting of researchers (CIOMS, pp.88-
90; TCPS2, Article 6.14; WMA, point 23). That is, those who are likely to engage in misconduct 
(i.e., researchers) are given the responsibility to centrally monitor ongoing studies (as per TPCS2 
Articles 11.7, 11.8, and 11.9) and report to REBs, to enable continuous review.  
Also, in some clinical trials, REBs require research teams to have a data monitoring plan, 
which leads to sponsors appointing or setting up a DSMB for the trial. However, these DSMBs 
are accountable to the trial sponsor who appointed them. Thus, the DSMB submits its monitoring 
report to the sponsor (and the researcher) who is required to submit to the REB.  
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The appointment of DSMBs should not alter the monitoring responsibility of REBs or 
preclude REBs from their continual monitoring responsibilities. Therefore, if the protection of 
research subjects when a study is ongoing is all about continuously getting reports from 
researchers and reviewing those reports, then that clearly cannot be adequate protection, 
especially when there are obvious disincentives in researchers reporting on their misconduct.  
The Canadian research oversight system is a passive system. The monitoring 
mechanisms, as stated by the various guidelines, are not proactive ways of protecting subjects, 
ensuring research protocol compliance, and dealing with potential research misconduct. 
Researchers may not always report adverse events or report changes to their protocol, and 
participants may not be aware when they have been unnecessarily exposed to risks. Canada’s 
oversight system has been over-reliant on whistle-blowers and also focused on responding to 
misconduct rather than having ways of identifying and addressing potential research misconducts 
when a project is ongoing (HAL report, 2009). That is, for REBs to become aware that 
something has gone wrong in the research, they must be told, hence the reliance on 
whistleblowers who might not be the researchers and might have an incentive of not reporting.  
The inadequacy of the oversight system is not limited to the developed world. Currently, 
many African countries do have regulatory documents that guide the ethical conduct of research, 
just like Canada’s TCPS2 and the US Common Rule. In theory, the oversight system in most 
African countries is not so different from the developed world. For instance, in 1974, Zimbabwe 
established a medical research council under the Research Act of 1959 to provide research 
oversight. Around the same time, South Africa also established a medical research council to 
provide research oversight (Ndebele et al., 2014). The US National Research Act that gave birth 
to the Belmont Report and subsequently the Common Rule was established in 1974, 15 years 
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after Zimbabwe’s Research Act of 1959. Also, institutions like the African Union (AU) and the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) have played a significant role in 
promoting and strengthening research oversight in Africa (Ndebele et al., 2014).  
However, research oversight in Africa has some lapses, just like in the developed world. 
In practice, oversight in the African context has been described to be very weak and sometimes 
non-existent (Boateng et al., 2014; Kilama, 2005; Kombe et al., 2014), even though minimal 
scholarly work has been done on the nature and extent of research oversight in Africa (Kombe et 
al., 2014). The weak oversight system has been the reason for the recent increase in the amount 
of research conducted in Africa and other developing countries (Jeong et al., 2017). Some 
commentators have suggested the consequences of the ‘lax oversight system’ is ethics dumping 
(that is, many unethical research practices are being exported to Africa and other developing 
countries) (Schroeder, Cook Lucas, Hirsch, Fenet, & Muthuswamy, 2018). Surprisingly, there 
have been fewer documented cases of research misconduct (Kombe et al., 2014; Okonta & 
Rossouw, 2014), unlike the developed world, and that does not in any way suggest the absence 
of challenges. The absence of scholarly work on research oversight and misconduct is, in itself, a 
considerable concern. Indeed, the developing world is challenged in several ways.  
 
3.4 Why trust alone is an inadequate regulatory mechanism 
The REBs regulatory systems or monitoring mechanisms rely heavily on reports from 
researchers (Klitzman, 2011) and function largely on trust (Korenman, 2006). REBs rely on the 
good faith of researchers to assure compliance with an approved study (Sheehan, 2007). That is, 
REBs trust that researchers will carry out studies according to approved protocols, that the data 
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will be collected carefully, that the interests of the subjects will be primary and will supersede 
that of the researcher or any research interests. REBs trust that researchers' potential conflicts of 
interest will also not interfere with or bias the study. Elliott (2015) therefore describes the REB’s 
regulatory systems or monitoring mechanisms as an “honour code”.  
However, many reformers including Elliott have been wondering why a potentially 
dangerous enterprise like the research enterprise would rely on an “honour code or a trust code” 
to protect research subjects and to ensure research integrity. Elliott (2015) draws an analogy 
likening research oversight by REBs to the work of food inspectors. Elliot (2015) quizzes; 
“imagine if food inspectors never actually set foot in meatpacking plants, but gave approval 
based entirely on paperwork filled out by the owners” (para. 9). Something analogous is 
happening with REB oversight.  
The claim that ‘there is a need for active monitoring of research’ is often perceived to 
imply that researchers are dishonest and unethical individuals who cannot be trusted or are not 
interested in the safety of research subjects (Cooper, 1984; Levine, 1980). For instance, Levine 
(1980) argues that active monitoring would likely back the presumption that researchers may be 
“operating from presumptions of mistrust”(p. 100). He further argues that active monitoring 
erodes one of the basic assumptions that form the foundation of life within a university 
community— “that members of the institution are to be trusted until contrary evidence is brought 
forward” (Levine, 1980, p. 99-100).  
Interestingly, there is enough evidence to suggest that a substantial number of researchers 
engage in unethical behaviour (Cohen & Lynch, 2014). Research scandals like ‘Tuskegee’ 
(Wurtzurg, 2016), ‘Dan Markingson’ (Apau Bediako, 2018; Elliott, 2010; 2015), ‘Ranjit 
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Chandra’s study’ (Webb, 2017), ‘Jesse Gelsinger’ (Meyer, 2000; Steinbrook, 2008; Stolberg, 
1999) and other similar ones have left behind a huge legacy of distrust in the field of research 
with human subjects. These studies were conducted and often completed, and subjects were 
exposed to greater risks -resulting in deaths in some cases- without the knowledge of REBs. 
These scandals would not have been exposed if not for whistleblowers or for the deaths that 
occurred. These research scandals have led us to the conclusion that trust is not enough 
(Korenman, 2006), and therefore Levine’s argument against monitoring - and in favor of trust- 
lacks force. Even though trust is necessary, it is woefully inadequate in ensuring ethically 
appropriate conduct in the conduct of research.  
Also, the reputation of clinical researchers as truth-seekers is continually being threatened 
by the discovery of scandals and research abuses (Fanelli, 2009). Therefore, the research 
enterprise should not “unjustifiably assume that investigators with good faith will entirely 
implement the recommendations of REBs” (Christakis, 1988, p. 9). Clinical research, 
traditionally a scholarly affair, is now a multi-billion-dollar profit-driven industry (Elliott, 2015). 
The causes and pressures leading to misconduct are more powerful, pervasive, and much more 
complicated. Again, increasingly, the research enterprise is shifting from being publicly-funded 
towards pharma and private sponsorship (Tierney et al., 2016). These current trends are a 
potential threat to subject safety and have many implications for the integrity of the research 
enterprise. In this new context of private funding, the lack of specificity about the role of REBs 
concerning continuous monitoring of research and centrally depending on researchers to monitor 
research is worrying. It is puzzling as to why a researcher with a financial conflict of interest is 
the same individual who monitors his or her research to ensure that the financial conflict of 
interest does not compromise subject safety. The dynamics of research in practice can be very 
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different from what is presented in protocols and proposals even though there may be no 
deliberate intention to deceive REBs or put subjects at serious risk (Sieber et al., 2002; Woollen, 
n.d.). Researchers sometimes fail at implementing REB recommendations not through 
intentional means, but through administrative error (Christakis, 1988; Woollen, n.d.), which 
equally places subjects at serious risk (Adkinson et al., 1983).  
 
3.5 What “trust” has led to (Infamous research scandals) 
The current REB monitoring mechanism has been inadequate. If there were any lessons 
learned from the Tuskegee syphilis study, the nutrition study in residential schools, and the 
Willowbrook school experiment, these recent similar scandals would not have happened. These 
instances of research misconduct have stained the integrity of the research enterprise and lend 
credence to the fact that trusting researchers is not enough to protect research subjects and to 
ensure the integrity of the research industry. These instances of misconduct are reflections of 
weakness in oversight and highlight the overall inadequacy of current continuous monitoring 
mechanisms. I present below what the current regulatory/monitoring system (i.e. the trust code) 
had led to, that is, infamous research scandals.  
 
The Dan Markingson Scandal 
In 2004, Dan Markingson violently killed himself while enrolled in a pharmaceutical 
company-sponsored multi-site study (the CAFÉ study) at the University of Minnesota’s teaching 
hospital (Elliott, 2017a, 2015, 2010). The study compared 3 second-generation antipsychotics 
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among persons experiencing psychosis for the first time. Dr. Olson, the site investigator, was 
also Markingson’s psychiatrist, and $15,648 was generated for the University of Minnesota’s 
psychiatry department for each subject who completed the CAFE study (Elliott, 2010). These 
conflicts of interest were enough reasons for the study to be actively monitored to avoid coercive 
enrolment of vulnerable patients as subjects and to also ensure subject safety.  
The study’s informed consent process was flawed (Apau Bediako, 2018). Markingson 
while on a court-granted involuntary commitment to treatment order, was enrolled in the CAFÉ 
study. The court order was deemed necessary as Markingson was assessed to be dangerous, and 
disorganized in thinking, and therefore, could not make treatment decisions (Apau Bediako, 
2018; Elliott, 2017a, 2015, 2010). Despite his inability to make treatment decisions, he 
surprisingly consented to participate in the CAFÉ study. Again, Markingson was threatened to 
sign a document that if he failed to both show up for his research appointments and take his 
research medications, he would be returned to involuntary confinement. Even when 
Markingson’s mental health was retrogressing and was at risk of suicide, he was still kept in the 
study until his death (Elliott, 2017a, 2015, 2010). These events were not reported to the IRB.  
Without active monitoring of research, subjects and overall safety standards can be taken 
for granted. The CAFÉ study was furthered at the expense of Markingson’s clinical needs. REBs 
should, in practice, have mechanisms for monitoring the standard of care subjects receive in a 
research setting.  
 
Dr. Mani Pavuluri’s research 
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Dr. Mani Pavuluri was a child psychiatrist at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Her 
study, which ran from 2009 until 2013, investigated the functioning of the brains of adolescents 
with bipolar affective disorder during the manic state and after eight weeks of lithium treatment, 
using imaging. Dr. Pavuluri was non-compliant with approved study guidelines and abandoned 
the study’s safety precautions. She violated protocol and put the lives of these children at serious 
risk. The violations in Pavuluri’s research included the fact that 89 of the 103 subjects (86%) did 
not meet eligibility criteria. Pavuluri recruited children younger than ten years even though the 
approved inclusion criteria by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) required boys and 
girls of ages 13 to 16 years. She also failed to give some girls pregnancy tests before 
administering them lithium, and knowingly made false statements about the subjects’ medication 
histories which ‘seriously compromised’ the integrity of her work (Cohen, 2018).  
The University of Illinois’s IRB gave approval for the eligibility age to be lowered to 10 
years despite the grantor’s (NIMH) prohibition. The University’s IRB failed to demand an 
explanation as to why the recruitment age was being lowered to 10 years after the initial review 
of the study (the NIMH letter to the University’s Vice Chancellor for Research cited by Cohen, 
2018). A letter from the NIMH that followed an investigation of the misconduct also stated that 
there was “insufficient initial review by the IRB and inadequate documentation to support 
subsequent expedited review” (Cohen, 2018, p. 2 of NIMH letter). 
Even though her research was reviewed by an IRB and passively monitored, this did not 
prevent research misconduct. Pavuluri was subsequently barred from conducting research, and 
published articles from three studies were retracted. The University of Illinois paid back the 
NIMH’s $3 million that was granted Pavuluri for the research. 
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Ranjit Chandra’s research 
Dr. Ranjit Chandra was a professor at Memorial University, and also practiced pediatrics 
at the Janeway Child Health Center, St. John’s. He was one of the world’s leading experts on the 
relationship between nutrition and immunity, and was referred to as the “father of nutritional 
immunology” (Webb, 2017). 
Marilyn Harvey, a nurse who was employed by Chandra to recruit new parents to take 
part in his infant formula trials, ‘blew the whistle’ and reported that Chandra had published the 
results before all subjects were even recruited for the study, leading to Memorial University’s 
1994 enquiry (Webb, 2017). Chandra had data on only 46 subjects out of the 86 he had reported. 
Also, in a different study, Chandra did not mention anything about psychological testing in his 
proposal or protocol. Nonetheless, Chandra continued to conduct psychological testing on 
research subjects without any amendment to his protocol or approval from the REB (Pryse-
Phillips Report, 2009). Even though Chandra’s research was reviewed and passively monitored 
by an REB, these misconducts still occurred. 
 
Jesse Gelsinger and the genetic study  
In 1999, eighteen-year-old Jesse Gelsinger died while enrolled in a genetic study at the 
University of Pennsylvania. Gelsinger suffered from ornithine transcarbamylase (OTC) 
deficiency but was relatively healthy as his condition was controlled with a strict non-protein diet 
and drugs. Gelsinger had offered to enroll in the genetic study to test the safety of an intervention 
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for babies with a fatal form of his disorder, even though he was not going to benefit directly from 
the study (Stolberg, 1999).  
Dr. J. Wilson (the researcher) did not stop the study after learning of ‘serious toxicities or 
Grade III liver toxicity’ caused by the therapy (Steinbrook, 2008; Stolberg, 1999) and also failed 
to disclose these risks to participants. Though the study passed through initial approval by an 
IRB, the informed consent Gelsinger signed was different from what was reviewed, with some 
essential information on risks missing (Meyers, 2000). The conflict of interest in the Gelsinger 
scandal included significant financial interests in the outcome of the study (Stolberg, 1999). The 
researcher failed to halt the study even after some volunteers reached a “Grade III” liver toxicity 
(Steinbrook, 2008), probably because of an eagerness to be the first to achieve success in the 
gene-therapy of a rare condition. Novel or breakthrough studies such as this genetic study should 
have been monitored more closely to ensure compliance and safety of subjects. 
In all these scandals, researchers were able to carry on with their research because they 
knew their projects were being only passively monitored based on what they as researchers sent 
to REBs. The researchers in the Markingson study did not report Markingson’s health risks to 
their IRB or remove him from the study when he became at greater risk. Dr. Puvaluri made 
unapproved protocol changes and lied to her IRB. Dr. Chandra engaged in fraud undetected by 
his REB. Jesse Gelsinger was enrolled in a high risk study without being adequately informed of 
the risks as they appeared on the IRB-approved consent form. Research oversight bodies cannot 
assume that researchers will always implement their recommendations. These scandals are a dent 
on the integrity of the research enterprise and lend credence to the fact that there are lapses in the 
monitoring and oversight systems. If the enterprise sticks with the current monitoring 
mechanisms, these scandals will likely repeat themselves. 
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Continual monitoring of research is designed to ensure subject safety, research 
compliance, and integrity after post-initial-review of research (Ochieng et al., 2013). Even 
though REBs have a responsibility to monitor approved studies for ethical conduct as well as 
adherence to the approved protocol (WMA, 2018), continual monitoring seems to be a challenge 
(Ochieng et al., 2013). However, it is a step forward in re-establishing public confidence and 
trust in medical research (de Jong, van Zwieten, & Willems, 2013). 
I have argued that research with human subjects is vulnerable to misconduct and fraud 
due to the overall inadequacy of mechanisms in place for oversight and continual monitoring 
responsibilities. I also provided evidence of the prevalence of research misconduct, instances of 
gross research misconduct, and the centrality of researcher self-reporting for REB oversight, to 
defend the idea that adequate REB post-initial-review monitoring requires greater REB 
involvement, other than relying on trust and the researcher’s assurances. There is a need for a 
more proactive approach to these problems if the ethical conduct of research is to be achieved. 
REBs should be more active and have a more robust system that can guarantee the safety of 








CHAPTER FOUR: HOW REBs SHOULD MONITOR RESEARCH 
In previous chapters, I outlined the recommendations and requirements regarding REBs 
post-initial-review monitoring found in various influential research ethics guidelines like the 
TCPS2, the Common Rule, the CIOMS guideline, the WHO guideline, the ICH-GCP and the 
Declaration of Helsinki. I have also argued that research with human subjects is vulnerable to 
misconduct due to the overall inadequacy of mechanisms in place for oversight and monitoring 
responsibilities. Drawing on the prevalence of research misconduct, instances of gross research 
misconduct, and the centrality of researcher self-reporting for REB oversight, I defended the idea 
that adequate REB post-initial-review monitoring requires greater REB involvement, rather than 
trust and researcher’s assurances. In this final chapter, I outline what the increased monitoring I 
propose should consist of, and the practical constraints and challenges associated with executing 
these continuous monitoring responsibilities. I will also provide ethical justification for active 
ongoing monitoring mechanisms by REBs. This chapter focuses on a proactive monitoring 
process.  
 
4.1 The REB’s Active Continual Monitoring 
REBs evaluate proposed research for its ethical acceptability, evaluate researchers’ 
potential conflicts of interests, and evaluate the proposed study’s compliance with local and 
international regulations, laws, and policy statements designed to protect human subjects (Grady, 
2015). Primarily, REBs are institutions mandated to protect the rights and welfare of human 
research subjects and to ensure that a study is being conducted as per the approved protocol.  
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Undoubtedly, the continual monitoring responsibility remains within the purview of 
REBs (Heath, 1979; Weijer et al., 1995). Continual monitoring after initial review and 
subsequent approval of research is meant to protect the rights and welfare of research subjects 
throughout the study and ensure compliance (Christakis, 1988; de Jong et al., 2013; Garrard & 
Dawson, 2005). Thus, the protection of human research subjects does not end after the initial 
review and approval (Saver, 2004; Silverman, 2007). However, it seems that the constitution of 
the monitoring responsibilities of REBs is somewhat indeterminate (Korenman, 2006). For 
instance, consent forms direct research subjects with complaints to REBs, and not to any other 
institution or office, such as Data and Safety Monitoring Boards (DSMBs) (Klitzman, 2011).  
Interestingly, in many jurisdictions, REBs do not fulfill the continuous monitoring 
responsibilities even though research non-compliance can compromise the safety and well-being 
of subjects and overall research integrity (Ochieng et al., 2013; Weijer et al., 1995). Relying on 
nominal annual review/reporting and ad hoc notifications of problems after they occur risk 
detecting problems only after harms have occurred. Bodies like DSMBs provide some form of 
oversight by monitoring collected data to ensure trial safety. Like the REB’s oversight 
mechanism, the DSMB’s monitoring of research is highly dependent on researchers, which I 
have argued against. Also, DSMBs are often appointed by research sponsors, raising ethical 
concerns (potential conflicts of interest) related to their continual monitoring responsibility.  
Klitzman (2011) suggested that how REBs learn about research misconduct includes 
whistle-blowing and occasional complaints by research staff and sometimes research subjects. In 
some other cases, REBs may not know about misconduct until a study is completed, and journals 
notice some misconduct during review (Kornfeld, 2012). These ways of learning about research 
misconduct are not proactive ways of ensuring subject safety and research integrity. Also, as I 
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have detailed previously, the kind of oversight typically provided by REBs when a study is 
ongoing is the continuous study review, where REBs rely primarily on the reports submitted by 
researchers, rather than on other possible means of oversight. Continuous research review may 
seem to mitigate research-related risks and harms when research is ongoing. However, the 
review of reports submitted by researchers does not optimally protect subjects, even though 
REBs are fulfilling their bare minimum requirement. Essentially, REBs are not adequately 
protecting research subjects but are being used by institutions to somewhat manage risks (Stark, 
2012), and to also protect these institutions from liabilities. There is a need for REBs to 
continually monitor research from post-initial-review until the dissemination of results (Romero, 
2013) to adequately protect while fulflling the interests of institutions. The integrity of clinical 
research and the safety of research subjects should not be traded off or taken for granted 
(Silverman, 2007). 
The active continual monitoring of research by REBs should constitute active onsite 
visits (Ochieng et al., 2013; Pickworth, 2000) and paternalistic continuous review, to examine 
research data and other study documents, observe and assess the informed consent process and 
documents, and also interview subjects and research staff. In this model of monitoring, REBs 
should look for the standard of care, informed consent, and conflict of interest and how these 
affect or are likely to affect the safety of research subjects. The active continual monitoring of 
research is a means to such ends. Optimal continual monitoring would not only strengthen 
protections research subjects, but likely support researchers in ensuring the highest quality 
research. 
 
4.1.1 Active Onsite Monitoring 
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The overall goal of this active onsite monitoring is to ensure compliance (protect 
subjects), to ensure quality improvement (by educating researchers), and to restore public 
confidence in the research enterprise (Ansmann et al., 2013; Gunsalus, 1993; London, 2012; 
Weijer et al., 1995). Active onsite monitoring goes beyond policing research with the sole 
intention of catching research misconduct. Active monitoring seeks to ensure that the study is 
being conducted ethically as per the terms of approval (Christakis, 1988; de Jong et al., 2013; 
Weijer, 2001) and aims to help researchers improve on research quality.  
The continual onsite monitoring of research can be done through routine visits, random 
spot-checks or both, to study sites to observe research procedures, review study documentation, 
and in some cases have interviews with subjects and relevant research staff (Ochieng et al., 2013; 
Shetty, Jadhav, Saiyed, & Desai, 2014). The continual monitoring process should include 
monitoring informed consent procedures to ensure they are consistent with the principle of 
respect for persons, and that the moral and legal requirements of informed consent are also 
fulfilled (Pullman, 1999). Also, the continual monitoring process should include monitoring 
conflict of interests to ensure such conflicts do not affect a subject’s well-being and safety, and 
the overall integrity of a study. The process should include monitoring the standard and quality 
of care in a research setting. Similarly, inclusion eligibility and exclusion requirements, timely 
safety monitoring (including reporting of adverse events), “adherence to protocol-mandated 
investigations and follow-up” (Godfrey et al., 2014, p. 2) should be monitored (Food and Drug 
Administration, 2013).  
 
4.1.2 What should REBs lookout for during continual monitoring? 
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Ideally, REBs should have an arrangement before the start of studies (i.e., clinical 
research) on the terms of active continuous monitoring. REBs should go on-site to have a first-
hand feel of how the study is going —rather than relying on the current passive monitoring 
system where REBs review reports submitted by researchers as a continual monitoring 
mechanism, or do an audit of suspected misconduct in a study, or of real misconduct after it has 
occurred (de Jong et al., 2013; Shetty et al., 2014).  
First, there is a need for REBs to ensure that proper research subject protection 
mechanisms are firmly in place by ensuring that all research subjects or SDMs are fully informed 
before giving their consent (Meyers, 2000). One of the ways researchers fail research subjects is 
by failing to enable informed consent, even though the REB might have initially approved the 
consent documents. Informed consent is a key element of the ethical conduct of research (Lorell, 
Mikita, Anderson, Hallinan, & Forrest 2015; Resnik, 2009) which incorporates a dual moral 
obligation, that is, respecting the autonomy of subjects and protecting vulnerable subjects 
(TCPS2, 2014). REBs should, therefore, monitor the informed consent process to ensure either 
of the dual moral obligations is fulfilled.  
Also, it is important for REBs to monitor to ensure that the cornerstone of research ethics 
(informed consent process) (Lorell et al., 2015) meets both the legal and moral requirements 
(Pullman, 1999). Fulfilling the moral requirement advertently and inadvertently leads to 
fulfilling the legal requirements (Pullman, 1999). This means a research subject should not only 
be made to sign consent forms to meet legal requirement but that the informed consent is given 
by a competent individual who has received the needed information, adequately understood the 
information and who, after careful consideration of the received information, has made a choice 
without being coerced, unduly influenced or induced, or intimidated. REBs must check the 
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consent process to ensure that subjects are aware of study-related risks and are also notified of 
changes about risks, benefits, and other study procedures (for example, the current version of 
consent forms are being used). The REB’s focus on monitoring informed consent should involve 
simple processes such as observing the recruitment and informed consent documentation process 
(Robertson, 1982), checking signed forms, and interviewing subjects to know they understood 
what they are consenting to. 
Secondly, whether or not researchers declare a conflict of interest at the initial review, it 
is crucial for REBs to continually monitor to ensure that the researcher's conflict of interest 
(either dual physician-researcher role or financial conflict of interest) or even institutional 
conflict of interest do not affect the interests or safety of research subjects in any way. REBs can 
fail subjects if they do not address potential or actual conflicts of interest when a study is 
ongoing (Sheehan, 2007).  
The major concern with conflict of interest is that it has the potential to unduly influence 
professional medical judgments, which affect a subject’s interests and defeats the goals of 
medicine (Lo & Field, 2009). For instance, the physician’s new role as a researcher can unduly 
influence a patient (a potential subject) because of the already existing physician-patient 
relationship. The relationship can make patients (i.e., potential subjects) vulnerable, which 
hinders autonomous decision-making. Also, financial conflicts of interest in the form of 
receiving financial incentives for the number of subjects who are able to complete a trial, or the 
promise of some shares should the trial be successful, or when the investigational product is 
commercialized, are ethically problematic. A financial conflict of interest might compel 
researchers to recruit potential subjects who may not meet inclusion criteria, or to require that 
subjects who ideally should be withdrawn from a study stay until the end of the research, as 
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exemplified in scandals like that of Dan Markingson (Elliott, 2010, 2015, 2017), Jesse Gelsinger 
(Meyer, 2000; Stolberg, 1999), and Dr. Pavuluri’s psychiatric research (Cohen, 2018). Sadly, 
research subjects become the ultimate victims whenever there are conflicts of interest.  
Also, the relationship between pharmaceutical companies or corporate sponsors, on the 
one hand, and researchers and their institutions, on the other hand, comes along with some 
ethical challenges even though this relationship is a boost for the research enterprise (Kaitin, 
2012; Komesaroff & Kerridge, 2002). The likelihood of researchers and their institutions 
becoming handmaidens of sponsors, acceding to sponsor’s demands, which may include 
engaging in unethical practices considering how powerful and pervasive the sponsor’s influence 
can be, should not be underestimated in this new research environment (Kohn, 1984). This 
relationship calls for REBs to be ethically vigilant by way of continuous monitoring when a 
study is ongoing. Merely declaring a conflict of interest is not enough, but continually 
monitoring conflict of interest is key to ensuring subject safety and overall research integrity. 
Research contracts should be thoroughly reviewed, and research procedures should be closely 
monitored to ensure ethical standards are not compromised.  
Lastly, it is important for subjects to receive the standard of care or its equivalent in a 
situation of clinical equipoise. That is, subjects who volunteer to ensure the progress of science 
should receive the standard of care that was approved by the reviewing REB. Anything less than 
the REB-approved standard or level of care can jeopardize the well-being and safety of these 
subjects and the trust of these subjects in research, should anything go wrong.  
REBs should monitor ongoing research by examining study documents and going to 
study sites to know the quality or standard of care research subjects receive in the research 
setting; this is what the ongoing protection of subjects and ensuring the well-being of research 
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subjects should be about. The onsite visits and review of study documents will ensure that the 
research is not being furthered at the expense of the clinical needs of subjects who may also be 
patients as well (Schooler & Baker, 1999). For instance, in the Dan Markingson and Jesse 
Gelsinger cases, research was furthered at the expense of the clinical needs of these subjects. 
Markingson was kept on the experimental drug until he died, even though he was not doing well 
on that medication (Apau Bediako, 2018; Elliott, 2010, 2015). As we have seen, he was 
threatened with involuntary confinement by the researchers if he stopped taking the experimental 
drug. Also, the decision to give Gelsinger the highest dose of the vector infusion even though his 
liver was not functioning at the minimal level required for infusion raises a concern about the 
quality of care in a research environment (Steinbrook, 2008; Wilson, 2009). Subjects before 
Gelsinger reached a “Grade III” liver toxicity even when they received lower dosages of the 
vector than what Gelsinger received (Steinbrook, 2008; Wilson, 2009). The “Grade III” liver 
damage or toxicity is a serious adverse event that required the study should be temporarily 
stopped, and regulators notified. However, researchers neither halted the study nor notified REBs 
(Weiss & Nelson, 1999).  
REBs have a role in protecting research subjects both by fostering meaningful informed 
consent and by protecting from bias due to conflicts of interest. In the absence of ongoing 
monitoring, deficits in informed consent or untoward effects of conflicts of interest might 
otherwise be missed. The standard and quality of care subjects receive when the actual project is 
being done should be of importance to REBs.  
 
4.1.3 Paternalistic continuous review 
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There is a moral duty to protect (and rescue) altruistic research subjects. Therefore, in the 
course of the study, REBs continuously review research reports to assess the study’s progress. 
During this review, REBs may suspend or terminate an ongoing study for non-compliance or 
safety concerns (Godfrey et al., 2014). This continuous review process to protect research 
subjects’ interests, while the study is ongoing, after initial approval and after subjects or 
substitute decision-makers (SDMs) have consented to participate, has been described as 
“paternalistic” (Edwards, Kirchin, & Huxtable, 2004). Though considered paternalistic, REB 
review of research reports is a bare minimum requirement for the protection of research subjects 
(Weijer et al., 1995). This paternalistic continuous review (as I have already argued) is 
insufficient.  
Interestingly, some commentators have advanced arguments against even this minimum 
level of “paternalistic” review. For instance, Greener (2009) argues that paternalistic continuous 
review likely stunts research progress. The arguments against paternalistic continuous review are 
designed to justify a situation in which there will be less research oversight or even no oversight. 
Another argument is that paternalistic continuous review defies the subject’s autonomous 
decision-making (Wendler, 2017), even though such a review is an exercise of moral and legal 
authority. According to this line of argument, once a subject consents to participate in a study 
after “full disclosure,” any subsequent decision that overrules that of the competent-autonomous 
subject is paternalistic, and this form of paternalism is stifling. The autonomy-based argument 
suggests that informed consent adequately justifies exposing subjects to risks and harms. 
Indeed, the paternalistic continuous review of research is not pro tanto wrong. While still 
insufficient, continuous paternalistic review helps ensure the safety of subjects by terminating 
studies whose risks seem to be increasing or for reasons related to protocol non-compliance. 
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REBs must ensure the safety of these “altruistic” research subjects who have volunteered to 
contribute to scientific knowledge while ensuring that researchers also comply with all local, 
federal, international and institutional research ethics regulations to protect institutions from 
liabilities (Fleischman, 2005; Greenwald et al., 1982). It is only right for REBs to exercise their 
moral and legal authority by shutting down studies whose risks or harms seem no longer 
reasonable or for ethical non-compliance even though subjects or the public are likely to benefit 
(Savulescu, 2001). If anything, REBs should be doing this paternalistic continuous review 
together with active onsite visits as part of the continual research monitoring process of an 
ongoing study.  
Currently, REBs are poorly armed to deal with the realities and uncertainties of research 
with human subjects (Cohen & Lynch, 2014). Therefore, the calls for less or even no oversight 
when a study is ongoing are absurd and worrying, given that research misconduct is common 
(Gupta, 2013), and that research subjects would be unnecessarily exposed to unreasonable levels 
of risk without some level of oversight. The active continual research monitoring is justified on 
both utilitarian and deontological grounds to adequately protect subjects, ensure researchers' 
compliance and also ensure the overall integrity of the research enterprise. That is, continuous 
paternalistic research review along with my recommended active onsite visits would help 
researchers to comply with terms of approval, leading to improvement in the quality of research, 
thereby “preventing disastrous social outcomes” that the research enterprise and all of its 
stakeholders wish to avoid and also act as a moral safeguard against the abuse of social authority 
(London, 2012, p. 931). This process would also provide a “credible social assurance” that 
research subjects are not being abused and that the risks to which they are being exposed are 
reasonable and relatively proportional to the potential social value of the scientific knowledge 
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likely to be generated from the study (London, 2012, p. 942). It would also ensure that overall 
balance of benefits against risks and harms are maximized (Resnik, 2015).  
I will now turn to examine the challenges and proposing a justification for this new 
model of REB oversight that incorporates active monitoring.  
 
4.2 Challenges with continual monitoring 
Active continual monitoring comes with several challenges. Central to this challenge is 
the already heavy workloads of the boards (Burman et al., 2001; Fost & Levine, 2007), the huge 
cost continual monitoring comes with (Hyman, 2007; Levine, 1988; Page & Nyeboer, 2017; 
Sugarman et al., 2005) and the institutional REB’s inherent conflict of interest (Pullman, 2002). 
Many of the recommendations for change to research subject protection mechanisms have 
subsequently suggested the need for support in reviewing and monitoring studies involving 
human subjects (De Vries & Forsberg, 2002; Page & Nyeboer, 2017). For instance, the National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission’s (NBAC) report in 2001 recommended adequate resources be 
provided for research oversight systems. Despite these recommendations, the system has still not 
received sufficient support.  
Currently, the composition of many REBs suggests there are very few members of the 
various boards to continually monitor the many studies REBs review (De Vries & Forsberg, 
2002; Fost & Levine, 2007).  For instance, in 2001, the US Office for Human Research 
Protections (OHRP) shut down some REBs (IRBs) because of very limited resources and fewer 
staff dedicated to the heavy workloads of these boards (De Vries and Forsberg 2002). An 
example of such closures was that of John Hopkins University School of Medicine REB (IRB), 
where the OHRP stated that oversight has been insufficient and that could be due to the 
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REB’s/IRB’s increasing workload and growing responsibilities vis-à-vis its limited 
resources (McNeilly, 2001). Also, De Vries and Forsberg (2002) cited how 86 REBs (IRBs) in 
the US had oversight of a total of 35,071 studies. This increasing workload suggests the 
volunteer-driven REB model ought to be realigned. There should be employees who would 
perform these monitoring functions, as in the case of Uganda (Ochieng et al., 2013).  
Fulfilling the active continual monitoring of research would be even more costly (Shetty 
et al., 2014). For instance, the estimated median amount spent by 63 academic medical centers in 
the US in 2002 for human research subject protection, which involved between 350 and 700 
protocols, was nearly $750,000 per year (Sugarman et al., 2005). The research oversight related 
costs would likely increase with active continual monitoring because REBs would have to 
employ many more experts as monitors in addition to their volunteers.  
Many scholars have argued against the huge costs associated with active continual 
monitoring. For example, Levine (1988) proposed that “trust is much less costly, whether the 
costs are expressed in terms of dollars or human resources…” (p. 349). However, ‘the trust 
system’ (as I have argued) is currently inadequate as the clinical research environment has 
changed and continues to evolve. The research environment has become more complex and more 
profit-driven in the last two decades. The trust system led to many research scandals and abuses 
in the past, and some of these scandals are recurring. Essentially, ‘the trust system’ cannot be 
trusted. REBs should, therefore, be adequately resourced to undertake this continual monitoring 
responsibility (Kombe et al., 2014). More resources should be allocated to REBs than they 
currently are receiving (Kombe et al., 2014; Pullman, 2002). Institutions should increase budgets 
allocated to REBs (Boateng et al., 2014; Kombe et al., 2014), taking into consideration not only 
the costs of doing this active research monitoring (i.e., the financial cost of continual monitoring 
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and providing adequate human resources), but also the costs of not doing it (i.e., costs to research 
subject safety and research integrity). For instance, (as I have mentioned previously), a US study 
suggested that the dollar cost of retraction of a published article is almost $400,000 (Stern et al., 
2014). However, the damaging effect of a single scandal or case of research misconduct to the 
trust in the research enterprise is immeasurable or incalculable (Schwarz, 1991). The cost of a 
loss of a trust is a bigger expense than the money not spent. 
While some commentators (for example, London, 2012) have suggested that the active 
continual monitoring of research could lead to “discontent among researchers who are able to 
identify the costs and burdens” associated with continual monitoring easily but fail to identify its 
benefits (p. 931), this is not necessarily the case. In some jurisdictions, the need for active 
continual monitoring has been identified and has been supported by researchers (McCusker, 
Kruszewski, Lacey, & Schiff, 2001; McNeill., Berglund & Webster, 1992). For instance, in 
Australia, even though REBs/RECs rely on researcher self-reporting to continually monitor 
research, researchers expressed support for active monitoring by REBs/RECs, stating that 
monitoring would “prevent people from deviating from their research if they knew it was 
possible that they would be monitored. One researcher said monitoring was ‘a big stick that 
makes you think” (McNeill et al., 1992, p. 321). Also, a Canadian study by McCusker et al. 
(2001), which reported on continual monitoring suggested that researchers were supportive of 
continual monitoring of research. Evidence from studies in Uganda and the UK on the REB’s 
continual monitoring responsibilities also lend credence to the fact that this model is not only 
feasible but helps identify and prevent misconduct and also helps in educating researchers 
(McCusker et al., 2001; Ochieng et al., 2013; Pickworth, 2000) who may unintentionally be 
engaging in research misconduct or unethical practices (Woollen, n.d.). In a resource-challenged 
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setting like Uganda, Ochieng et al. (2013) acknowledge the success of an active monitoring 
program. The monitoring teams, made up of two experts and an assistant, used methods such as 
scheduled and unscheduled visits to study sites to review documents, to make observations, and 
also have verbal interviews with research staff and subjects. The site monitoring activities 
revealed unethical practices, including violations of subjects’ rights and welfare, and violations 
of the informed consent process, among other things. Researchers were also educated during 
these site visits (Ochieng et al., 2013).  
 
4.3 Is Self-monitoring an alternative to this “resource-intensive” model?  
First of all, I attempt to address the institutional REB’s conflict of interest before 
discussing whether or not there is an alternative to this “resource-intensive” model.  
REBs serve the interests of various stakeholders, including that of research subjects and 
the institutions that established REBs, and are therefore inherently in conflict (Pullman, 2002). 
As Pullman (2002) argues, “the current tension between their legal and moral responsibilities can 
hinder them in their moral mandate” (p. 542). Likewise, REBs may fail research subjects in an 
attempt to also serve the interests of institutions that established them. To deal with the inherent 
institutional conflict of interest, which sometimes contributes to the REB’s lax oversight when 
research is ongoing, the alternative is to have an independently funded regional oversight body 
just like Newfoundland Provincial Health Research Ethics Authority (HREA). Such an 
independent oversight body will provide an arm’s length monitoring —where academic or 
research institutions would have no or less authority over the REBs (Pullman, 2002). This would 
partly address the inherent conflicts of interests and the pressures mounted on REB members by 
an institution in cases where the institution stands to significantly benefit from the research.  
60 
A proposed alternative to this resource-intensive model of oversight is a heavier reliance 
on self-monitoring by both research sponsors and research institutions. Some have argued that 
public research sponsors could be strengthened in their ability to penalize the research 
institutions in which misconduct occurs. In particular, institutions have a clear financial interest 
in the research enterprise (Pullman, 2002) such that their financial self-interest might be directed 
to ensure that researchers comply strictly with their research protocols and that they protect 
research subjects. The disincentive in engaging in misconduct is that there would be huge 
financial consequences or penalties and institutions may lose their right to conduct research. 
These penalties and sanctions may address institutional conflicts of interests, which sometimes 
contribute to the lax oversight or misconduct being ‘swept under the carpet’. 
However, the fear of being financially penalized may not adequately ensure the kind of 
oversight that is ideal for the current research enterprise, especially in this age of clinical 
research commercialization— thus, it may not prevent researchers from engaging in misconduct, 
nor will it likely detect unethical practices early. For instance, even when researchers know they 
risk being personally penalized, when they risk ending their enviable academic careers and all 
other successes they have built over the years, some researchers still engage in misconduct. 
Therefore, if institutions are to be penalized for unethical research or research misconduct, that 
may not prevent researchers from engaging in unethical practices.  
The way institutions can prevent scandals and their likely consequences (i.e. the heavy 
financial penalties and losing the right to conduct research) is to be more proactive. That is, if 
institutions fear they might be penalized for unethical research, then the way for institutions to 
avoid such penalties is to empower and adequately resource REBs who will, in turn, ensure strict 
protocol compliance by being proactive. As Pullman (2002) argues, "if ongoing human research 
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is to be conducted in an ethically responsible manner, IRBs will need to be supplied with the 
resources necessary to fulfill their institutional and societal roles" (p. 527). Increased financial 
penalties can only result in greater protections against research misconduct if they incentivize 
proactive oversight that would prevent research misconduct. 
Also, the idea of financial penalties enforced by public granting agencies would only 
work for clinical research funded through public grants. Unfortunately, many studies are 
exclusively funded by private sponsors. Thus, many research institutions may evade public 
sponsors’ sanctions or penalties.  
 
4.4 Justifying the need for continual monitoring of research by REBs 
There are three underlying reasons why REBs do not actively monitor ongoing studies 
after the initial approval. These reasons include the cost of active continual monitoring in terms 
of both financial and human resources, a lack of a clear framework on what should constitute 
continual monitoring (Ochieng et al., 2013; Pickworth, 2000) and the institutional REB’s 
inherent conflict of interest (Pullman, 2002). I have outlined what continual monitoring should 
constitute, addressed REBs’ conflict of interests and will now provide justification for the need 
for active continual monitoring.  
There is a need to continually monitor research through active on-site monitoring and 
continuous paternalistic review to minimize unethical tendencies. Research misconduct has very 
often occurred after REBs have given initial approval of studies. Given the evidence on 
increasing levels of research misconduct and the recurrence of preventable research scandals, the 
status quo (i.e., the current continuous monitoring mechanisms) is not adequately protecting 
research subjects and ensuring the integrity of the research enterprise. Most cases of known 
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misconduct and scandals could have been prevented if there were proper monitoring systems in 
place after the initial research approval. Also, the anti-paternalistic call for less research 
oversight or less stringent ongoing oversight would be disastrous for the research enterprise and 
unreasonably risky for these altruistic research subjects. The need to strengthen our continual 
monitoring system is urgent if the protection of research subjects and ensuring research integrity 
are key to the ethical conduct of research. Therefore, there are convincing reasons why REB 
continual monitoring mechanisms should be strengthened or revamped. I offer three arguments 
in support of this approach. 
First, there is a moral interest in ensuring the ethical conduct of clinical research because 
it acts as evidence for the approval of new medications, therapies, interventions and health 
policies. Clinical research is an important aspect of clinical medicine and the development of 
healthcare policies (Fleischman, 2005). If the integrity of clinical research monitoring and 
oversight are based only on trust and researchers’ self-reporting (Klitzman, 2011; Korenman, 
2006), then medications, clinical practice guidelines, approved therapeutic intervention, and 
healthcare policies risk being based on compromised research. For instance, if we fail to 
continually monitor research to ensure its integrity, we may continue to have drugs like Vioxx 
and Trovan on the market. Even though these drugs were eventually withdrawn from markets, an 
FDA investigator, David Graham, estimated Vioxx alone could have resulted in about 60,000 
deaths out of 140,000 associated heart attacks (Herper, 2005, 2004). The Vioxx adverse events 
were noted in a post-market trial that compared Vioxx and another medication. To give another 
example, an influential guideline on intravenous fluid therapy in the UK had referenced some 
tainted articles by German anesthesiologist Joachim Boldt, which were subsequently retracted 
(Marcus, 2018). There is a need to ensure the highest form of scientific evidence that is based on 
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sound ethical practices to understand the current trends in the management of diseases and 
disorders. The “trust code” is inadequate in ensuring overall research integrity. We cannot 
continue to allow unethical or compromised research to serve as the foundation of clinical 
medication or inform healthcare policies. Hence the need for a revamp to the current monitoring 
systems. The lives of millions of people, including research subjects and users of these 
medications and therapies, are at stake. We are all potential users of the pharmaceuticals and 
other end products of clinical research.  
Secondly, even though misconduct may not always affect study results, it seriously 
undermines public trust in medical research. The revelation of clinical research scandals after 
World War II and subsequent notable cases created a fearful impression of medical research. The 
trust of the public in clinical research continues to erode. The reservoir of public trust and 
confidence is reduced whenever there is a revelation of a scandal or research abuse (London, 
2012), risking pervasive public skepticism of research with human subjects. The trust and 
willingness of patients, subjects, and the general public to participate in research have been taken 
for granted in times past.  
The current monitoring mechanisms which have led to scandals, abuses and unethical 
practices left a huge legacy of distrust (Kohn, 1984), most notably in the developed worlds. By 
sticking to current monitoring mechanisms, we implicitly assume that researchers are 
“fundamentally ethical individuals who will always put the best interest of participants in 
research first, and certainly before the needs of the research itself” (Jamrozik, 2000, p. 336). 
However, this assumption is not entirely right, as research misconduct is a reality. Extensive 
evidence also shows that many researchers engage in unethical practices (Cohen & Lynch, 
2014). There is a need to ensure that the research process does not continue to damage the trust 
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and confidence of the public in scientific endeavours, as have previous scandals and abuses 
(HAL report, 2009; Kohn, 1984). The reform of current monitoring mechanisms could mitigate 
the damage that research misconduct, abuses, and scandals have done to public trust in clinical 
research, which is important for accepting the role of scientific evidence in clinical care and 
public health policy (HAL report, 2009).   
Lastly, the research enterprise is a multi-billion dollar industry (Elliott, 2015). Over time, 
the percentage of research funding coming from the pharma-industry and other private agencies 
has increased (Bluestone et al., 2018). For instance, pharma industry research spending increased 
from approximately $1 billion in 1970 to $30 billion in 2010, which far exceeds the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) budget (NIH Office of Budget, 2010). Also, as of 2015, the US federal 
government’s investment in research stood at 22%, whereas the industry’s investment 
represented 64% of total spending on research (Bluestone et al., 2018). The decline in federal 
funds suggest that many medical institutions and research centers have been under pressure over 
the last few years to attract industry dollars to fund their research programs. Also, researchers are 
under pressure and compelled to seek industry funding due to decreasing success rates in 
applying for the already declining federal funds leading to an “interesting” new relationship 
between pharmaceutical companies and cooperate sponsors, on the one hand, and researchers 
and their institutions, on the other hand. This relationship is very much needed and a boost for 
the research enterprise.  
However, the relationship comes with several ethical challenges (Komesaroff & 
Kerridge, 2002). The commitment or interest of researchers and their institutions, and the 
commitment or interest of sponsors are not always aligned, and mostly in sharp contrast (Lewis 
et al., 2001; Wendler, 2017). Whereas researchers and their institutions are interested in 
65 
scientific knowledge (non-profit interest), sponsors, especially pharma industries, have an 
interest in securing huge profits for shareholders (Wendler, 2017). The commercial sponsorship 
of research has heightened the potential for conflicts of interest which is a threat to the integrity 
of scientific investigations and also threatens the public’s trust in medicine. Also, the powerful 
and pervasive influence of these sponsors create an environment where researchers and their 
institutions succumb to the demands of sponsors, which may include engaging in unethical 
practices (Kohn, 1984). It is, therefore, potentially dangerous not to monitor such a profit-driven 
industry with such huge investments for ethical compliance and quality improvement. The 
current monitoring system is not enough to ensure the integrity of research in this new 
environment of private sponsorship.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
Clinical research represents the medical community’s desires and hopes to acquire 
knowledge to help advance the health of individuals and societies. This attempt to fulfill the 
desires and hopes of the scientific community comes along with several risks to the human 
research subjects who are being used as a means to an end. As a result of these risks to the 
human subjects, there has been a keen focus on research subject protection over the years, 
leading to several regulations and reforms. Unfortunately, recent attempts at reforming the 
protection mechanisms are often met with stiff disagreements between those who see the REB 
system as inadequate and those who see the REB oversight as stifling and therefore, should not 
go beyond continuous review. Several commentators have also suggested there are not enough 
resources for REBs to go beyond continuous research review.   
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However, as I have demonstrated, the status quo is not working given the level of research 
misconduct and the recurrence of preventable scandals and unethical practices. There have been 
so many acts after the initial protocol review and approval that are inconsistent with research 
ethics practices. More important, the safety of research subjects and the integrity of clinical 
research are imperative to good science. Therefore, REBs should be more active than they 
currently are by continually monitoring research after initial approval.  
As I have argued previously, REBs have the moral and legal authority to monitor clinical 
research until its completion. Their authority stems from the moral imperative to ensure that 
research subjects are safe and protected and to ensure the integrity of the research enterprise. 
Many REBs in Europe, North America, and other jurisdictions also draw their authority from 
federal regulations. Also, REBs have a significant role in preventing and dealing with research 
misconduct.  
Even though there is substantial evidence of research misconduct and resulting harm and 
sometimes deaths, little empirical work has been done to probe what actually happens on the 
ground in terms of monitoring. That is, little has been done on ways REBs can prevent and 
minimize risk factors for misconduct, detect early and timely investigate and correct research 
misconduct. I have argued on the ethical necessity of ongoing REB monitoring while the clinical 
research is being conducted; however, more scholarly work needs to be done on the experiences 
of members of REBs and university or hospital research offices on how they identify and address 
research misconduct and ethical breaches when identified. These scholarly works (especially 
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